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CAN THE RIGHT TO VOTE STOCK BE SEPARATED FROM ITS OWNERSHIP? Two or more stockholders in a corporation sometimes

wish to combine to elect the officers of the corporation, and, in
order that their stock may be voted as a unit, they enter into what
are known generally as Voting Trust agreements. How to make
these agreements binding upon the parties to them, has been a
puzzling question. The difficulty in all the devices that have been
tried finally resolves itself into the question of the separability of
the right to vote stock from its ownership, and upon this question
the opinions are more or less confused. Public policy has insinuated itself where it has no business; the distinctions between
trustee and agent have been left to take care of themselves; and the
not unusual lack of discrimination between Hght and power is
again exhibited.
48

NOTES.

Some of the cases declare illegal all agreements by which the
right to vote is separated from the ownership of stock--a result
due,. perhaps, to the undertone in the books, which deprecates
control by one man or clique and favors minority representation.
Judges, in their eagerness to protect persons from what turn out to
be ill-advised contracts, have lazily seized upon public policy as
their reason. It will be found, however, upon examination of the
cases, that in not one of them was the illegality of these agreements really involved. In Hafer v. N. Y. L. E. &- WV R.
R., 14 Wk. L. B., 68 (1885), the court decided that the contracts were void "both upon the ground that the power is denied
to one corporation thus to acquire control of another, and that the
stockholder cannot barter away the right to vote upon his stock."
The purpose of the agreement was improper, its object being to
give one corporation control over another. In the Shepaug Voting
Trust Cases, 6o Conn. 553 (1891), there was a secret agreement
underlying the pooling agreement, the object of which was to
secure profits from certain construction contracts in the extension
of the railroad; and the Voting Trust was, therefore, condemned,
because its purpose was repugiant to the fiduciary relationships of
the stockholders to one another. In Gage v. Fisher, 65 N. W.
(N. Da.) 809 (1896), the object was to give an office to one of
the parties to the contract, and, of course, this would not be aided
by a court of equity. Harvey v. Linville Imp. CO., 24 S. E. (N.
Ca.) 489 (1895), involved only the question of revocability of
proxy. In Vanderbilt v. Bennett, 6 Pa. Co. Court R. 193 (1888);
W;ite v. Thomas Inflatable Tire Co., 28 At. (N. J.) 75 (1893) ;
Ohio & -4. .R. Co. v. State, 32 N. E. (Ohio) 933 (1893), although
the dicta were strong to the effect that such agreements were absolutely void, the question of illegality was admittedly not involved.
Professor Baldwin, in x Yale Law Journal, argues that these agreements are illegal.
On the other hand, some cases see nothing illegal in such agreements, but these again used language broader than the cases justified. It was merely a question of revocability of proxy in
Griffith v. Jewett, 15 Wk. L. B. 419 (i886). Mlobile &- Ohio R.
R.v. Nicholas, 98 Ala. 92 (x892), and Smith v. San Francisco &
N. P. R. Co., 47 Pac. 582 (1897), were cases in which it was not
attempted to separate the right to vote stock from the ownership of
the same. It may be noted here that a reason, perhaps, for not
holding some of these agreements illegal at the instance of third
parties, is the uselessness in doing so; for the parties to them could
do just what the agreements say and their actions could not be assailed, it being impossible to go into the question of motives.
And in some cases, even if the contracts could be said to be
illegal, the corporation or a minority stockholder may not have a
standing in court to object.
Mr. Lilienthal (in io Harvard Law Review, page 428) not only
rejects the theory of illegality, but contends for a doctrine that
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would view with utter indifference a result by which a corporation
could be run entirely by outsiders. On page 433 he says: "Again
it will be admitted that the ownership of shares represents a double
right-the right' to vote and the right to participate in profits. If
it be laiful to sell'an interest in the latter right, as it undoubtedly
is, why not, then, in the former?"
If such contracts are illegal because contrary to public policy,
why is not a partnership holding a majority of stock also illegal?
On the other hand, shall we agree with Mr. Lilienthal that the
right to vote may pass from hand to hand, regardless of the ownership of stock? Because of the difficulty that one or the other
view has with such questions as these, and in view of the vagueness of the cases, it may be worth while-if for no other reason
than that of definiteness and clearness of thought-to look for an
underlying principle; and, in looking for such a principle, it were
better to avoid the too convenient reason of public policy, however fascinating it may be to talk of the duties of shareholders to
one another and of the confidence reposed in them by the state.
It makes no difference what shape the scheme to separate the
right to vote from the ownership of stock takes. Whether it be a
proxy to vote the stock, or an agreement with adequate consideration, or a transfer of the stock to a trustee, it seems that the
contention that the right to vote is separable from the ownership
of stock includes the assumption that it is a property right. Is it?
Some rights are ours merely because we are members of society.
Such is the right not to be assaulted, belonging as it does to every
human being merely as such. So there are rights which constitute
privileges of a certain class, belong to men because they are
members of one or another class. The right to vote, for instance,
is a man's, because he is a citizen or a member of a club or the
owner of shares in a corporation. Just as the right not to be assaulted is mine because I am a member of society, so the right to
vote stock in a corporation is mine because I am a member of the
corporation. Rights of the latter sort belong to fewer individuals
than do the former, because their classes are less inclusive; but they
are, nevertheless, precisely the same sort of rights. The classes may
be various-the nature of the right always remains the same. It is
purely and absolutely personal, and, from its very nature, is incapable of being separated from the man. It would be difficult to
think of the right not to be assaulted as transferable; the alienability of the right to vote is just as much of an impossibility.
These rights all belong to a man, because he has brought himself
within one or another class, and for no other reason. If he ceases
to be a member of the corporation, his right ceases. An outsider
may get the right only by becoming a member. The language of
the cases supports such a theory. " The franchise is an inseparable
incident of the ownership of stock:" Laffery v. Lafero, 26 Atl.
(Pa.) 388 (1893). "The right to vote is an incident of the
ownership of stock, and cannot exist apart from it:" Gr'ffth v.
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"It is the policy of our law
that an untrammeled power to vote shall be incident to the ownership- of stock:" Shepaug Voting Trust Cases, 6o Conn. 553
(x89z). "The right of voting stock is iniseparable from the right
of ownership. The one follows as a sequence from the other, and
the right to vote cannot be separated from the ownership without
the consent of the legal owner:" Tunis v. Heston'ille R. Co., 24
At. (Pa.) 88 (1892).
It is objected, however, that the right to vote is sometimes dissociated from the ownership of stock. A proxy is said to be such
a dissociation. It is true that the power to vote is separated, but the
right ever remains in the shareholder. The mere fact of agency does
not give the agent a right. If it does, why may he be deprived of it
without his consent-as, for instance, when I revoke his authority?
The truth is that in such a case I do not destroy any right that is
in the agent. I merely take away a fiower-withdraw my consent
from the personal relationship which cannot exist against my will:

Jewett, 15 Wk. L. B. 419 (1886).

Griffithv.Jewett, 15 Wk. L. B. 419 (1886) ; Woodrutff v. Duluque
&' S. C. R. Co., 3o Fed. 91 (1887). An owner of property

makes me an agent to sell. Do I get the right to sell, or merely
the power? There is no objection, of course, to an agent acquiring a right from a contract of agency; but that is a different
question.
Where the power is coupled with an interest, the right to vote is
then in the person who is to exercise the power. He becomes an
owner, and acts in his own name. Such are the cases of Shelmerdine v. Welsh, 20 Phila. 9z (1893), and Mobile &, Ohio R. R. Co.
v. Nicholas, 96 Ala. 92 (x892), in which cases the creditors are
really pledgees by the transfer to the trustees, who, as representatives of the creditors, have thus a pow~er coupled with an interest.
So when stock is held jointly, and one joint owner is given the
authority to vote, the right is not separated from the ownership:
Hey v. Dolphin, 92 Hun. 230 (1895); La.flerty v. Lafferty, 26
Atl. 388 (1893) ; Smith v. San Francisco & s. P. R. Co., 47 Pa.
582 (1864).
There is an apparent dissociation when the transfer book is closed
some time before the election. One who transfers after the books
are so closed may no longer have an interest in the stock and yet
may be allowed to vote. It has been held that a vote by the transferor under such circumstances, no objection being made, is not
void. But there is no case, I believe, which holds that the transferor has a right to vote as against the transferee. Is it contended
that he will be entitled to vote if the transferee challenges his right
to it? In American NationalBank v. Oriental.Mills, 23 Atl. 795
(1891), it is said that the holder of the legal title "would have
been bound to vote in accordance with the wishes of the holders of
the beneficial interest." Why would not the transferor who has not
even got legal title be also bound so to vote ? It is submitted that
in these cases the transferor is nothing more than an agent and that
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the rght of voting is never in the transferor as against the transferee.
The ownership of shares does not "represent a double right-the
right to vote and the right to participate in profits," any more than
it represents also the right to sell, thd right in certain cases to be g
director, or the right to sue for mismanagement, and although the
right to dividends, for instance, may be alienable, it is by no means
inconsistent that another right, as that of being a director, is not
alienable.
If the right to vote is a property right it is admittedly'assignable.
And if it may be the subject of sale, why not of gift? But no cage
or writer has ever intimated that the owner may part with the right
by gift. Indeed, all who have touched upon this part of the subject
affirmatively lay down that there must be a sufficient consideration.
Why in the world a consideration is insisted upon it is hard to understand, unless it be upon the belief (as it is sometimes laid down
in the books) that a power of attorney given for consideration is
not revocable. If so, it goes upon a proposition which can mean
nothing more than that the power must be coupled with an interest.
A question of contract is not necessarily involved and talk as to
consideration is irrelevant. It deserves notice that Fisherv. Bush,
42 N. Y. 641 (1870), the case mostly relied upon in this connection, is not satisfied with mutual promises-a fact indicative, perhaps, of the inseparability of the right to vote, for there can be no
objection to the adequacy of a promise as a consideration.
With these views none of the cases are in conflict. We may, indeed, believe that such contracts are not illegal; we will hesitate,
however, to concur in a theory which will give control of a corporation to persons who are not shareholders in it.
George Sterx.
Philadelphia, 1898.
CORPORATIONS-; STATUS OF STOCKHOLDER OF NATIONAL BANK;
SUBSCRIPTION INDUCED BY MISREPRESENTATION.
In [Vallace v.
flood, 89 Fed. I I, the receiver of a national bank sued to recover an

assessment alleged to'be due by defendant as a stockholder.

The

assessment had been duly made under Sees. 5151 and 5234 of the
Revised Statutes. The defence was that the shares in question had
been repurchased from original holders by the bank to keep up its
credit, the bank's funds being used for the purpose and the stock
transferred into the names of irresponsible employes ; that the de-

fendant, in ignorance of these facts, was induced to purchase the
stock by the fraudulent statements of the president as to the bank's
condition; that in spite of diligence he had been prevented by
false bookkeeping from ascertaining the true condition of the bank
until after the appointment of the receiver; and that he had then
learned that the corporation had been insolvent when the stock was
sold to him, and that, in point of fact, no part of the capital had
ever been paid for in cash, as required hy the National Banking Act.
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He tendered his certificate to the receiver and demanded repayment
of what he had paid for the stock. The tender and demand having
been- refused, the defendant presented with his answer a "crosspetition" praying for a recovery of the purchase money. To the
defence, based upon the purchase by the bank of its own stock, the
court opposed the principle of National Bank'v. Stewart, 107 U.
S.676 (1882), and of Bank v. Mlatthews, 98 U. S. 626 (1878),
holding that the stock was not thereby made void and that upon a
subsequent sale the proceeds went into the bank and restored its
capital for its creditors. As to the fraudulent misrepresentations,
the court cited 1r,,ton v. Englehart, 3 Dill. 496 (1874), and Judge
Dillon's comment therein uon Oakes v. Turquand,L. R. 2 H. L.
325 (i886).
While conceding that there may be cases in which a
stockholder can rescind the contract of purchase made voidable by
the fraud of the corporation's officer, the court thought that such a
right could never be asserted where the rights of corporate creditors
were concerned, those rights having attached during the time that
the defendant was a stockholder: Bank v. Newbegin, 20 C. C.
A. 329 (x896) ; Stuffelbeam v. De .Fashmutt, 83 Fed. 451
(1897) ; Bank v. MattheWs, 29 C.C.A. 491 (1897). The court
labored to justify this result on a theory of estoppel, that the stockholder had been held out as such by the official registry. Obviously
the true explanation is that afforded by partnership law and has
nothing to do with estoppel. Where B is induced by A's fraud to
become his partner, B is liable jointly with A to all creditors whose
debts accrue during the partnership. The liability results from the
status and corresponds in each case to a legal right in the creditor
which prevails over the partner's or stockholder's equitable right of
rescission. The doctrine of estoppel or holding out might apply if
the defendant were not a partner or a stockholder. It can have no
application where, as here, he is such in fact and in law. If this
principle had been recognized the court would have been spared the
task of separately discussing the "counter-petition," which it disposed of on the authority of Sheafe v. Larimer, 79 Fed. 921 (1897).
The court also made short work of the defence based upon non-payment of the original capital, citing Louisville Trust Co. v. L. N.,
Etc., Co., 22 C. C.A. 378 (x896) ; Casey v.Ga/li, 94 U. S. 673
(1876) ; Handley v. Stutz, 139 U. S.417 (1890).
INSURANCE; INTEREST IN THE LIFE INSURED. The Supreme
Court, Special Term, of New York, recently had before it a case
involving the interest necessary to maintain an action upon a policy
of life insurance. A had been lawfully married in Ireland. He
left there, his wife living, and came to New York, where he met the
plaintiff and became engaged to her, she not knowing that he had a
wife living. He was a member of a beneficial association and had
designated the plaintiff as beneficiary in case of his death. The
association paid the money into court on A's death, and it was
claimed by the plaintiff, and the representatives of A's wife, deceased
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after A's death. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to the money.
Although the court did not think it necessary that the plaintiff
should have an insurable interest in the life of A, yet.it was of the
opinion that she had such an interest • Bogartv. ThomPson, 53 N..
Y. Suppl. 622 (1898).

It is well settled that a woman who is engaged to be married to
a man has an insurable interest in his life: Chisholm v. Insurance
CO., 52 Mo. 213 (1873).
But that rule proceeds upon the view
that there is a legal contract to marry, which was absent in the
principal case. The reason is that the woman in such a case may
expect an advantage to result from the continuance of the life
insured.
Just what constitutes an interest in a life, in the sense required by
the law to support a policy of life insurance, has been much debated
in the past. It was once held that the interest required was such as
could be the subject of a contract of indemnity: Godsallv..Bodtero,
9 East. 72 (1807). But life insurance is no longer considered in
the light of indemnity: Dalby v. India & London Life Assurance
Co., iS C. B. 364 (1854).

And it has been decided that the in-

terest must be a pecuniary interest: Halfordv. Kymer, 1o B. & C.
724 (1830) ; Singleon v. .bsurance Co., 66 Mo. 63 (1877).
But
the weight of authority in this country is the other way: Lord v.
Dali, 12 Mass. 115 (x815) ; Insurance Co. v. Kane, 8x Pa. 154
(x876) ; Loons v. Insurance Co., 6 Gray, 396 (1856) ; Warnock
v. Davis, 104 U. S. 775 (x881).
In a case analogous to the principal case it was held that a woman
who lived with a man as his mistress, although he had a wife living,
has an insurable interest in his life, since she has a reasonable expectation of some pecuniary advantage from the continuance of it :
Lanpkin v. Tracler'sInsurace Co., 52 Pac. (Cal.) 1040 (i898 .
If the reason assigned in the cases which allow a woman to insure
the life of her betrothed, viz., the existence of a binding contract
from which some advantage may be expected, is valid, then it seems
that in a case like the principal case the plaintiff would not have an
interest, for there was no binding contract to marry. And in a case
like LaiPkin v. Traveler's Insurance Co., supra, it is hard to see

how the plaintiff had any expectation of advantage from a continuance of the iife insured and a consequent continuance of the
illicit relationship between them which the law would recognize. It certainly would not enforce any obligation arising out
of such a relation, and it is a well-established maxim that the
law will not give effect indirectly to what it will not enforce directly.
And if any one should be permitted to take advantage of the illegal
relation, it should be the insurance company, which has been led to
believe the plaintiff was the wife of the insured.
But it seems that the true explanation of these and kindred cases
lies in the fact that no intcres/ is required in cases where, from the
relationship of the parties, it is safe to conclude that the contract of
insurance was entered into bona fide, and that it was not a subter-
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fuge to support a wagering transaction. It is said in many of the
cases thaLt there is apresutnotionof interest in cases of close relationship: The interest ispurelysentimental. If that be so, then it would
follow that in any given case this presumption could be rebutted by
evidence to show that the parties were estranged or, per contra, the
same presumption could be raised by showing an intimacy between
the parties. But as matter of fact, no court would listen to such an
argument.
The courts have laid down hard and fast rules that
there are certain relationships which give rise to this presumption.
Therefore, it seems to be an improper use of terms to call it a presumption. It is the same thing as saying that in such cases no
interest is required.
The conclusion from the authorities seems to be that whenever
you have such a relationship between the parties as insures good
faith and fair dealing, then no interest is required to support a
policy of life insurance. These relationships have been confined by
the courts to marriage, persons under contract to marry, persons
tiving together as man and wife, and near degrees of consanguinity.
PARTNERSHIP; LIABILITY

OF ESTATE oF DECEASED

PARTNER.

Thompson v. WPite, 54 Pac. 718, is a most interesting case.
In it the Supreme Court of Colorado had before them a suit on a
joint book account and on joint promissory notes and checks, given
to evidence what was, in large part, a partnership debt of the makers.
One of the debtors died, and judgment was entered against his
executrix and the survivors. The question was whether the judgment against the executrix could stand. At Lommon law the contract of the creditor with the partner is a joint contract, and, in a
case like the present, the survivors alone would be liable. Obviously the theory of a joint contract is an inconvenient theory to
apply to a mercantile relation. What was really required was a
recognition that the contract, though joint in form, was several in
substance. Lord Mansfield perceived this, and decided, Rice v.
Shute, 5 Burr. 2611 (1770), accordingly. Instead of developing
his theory, courts of law continued to treat the contract as joint,
while courts of equity (instead of boldly declaring all contracts to
be several in equity, which would have been at least a coherent
doctrine), undertook to treat the contract as several only in partnership cases, in which one of the partners has died. The same contract, joint one day in law and equity, was next day joint at law
and several in equity: See opinion of Lord Selborne, in Kendall
v. Hamilton, 4 App. Cas. 504 (1879), at p. 537, et seq. Lord
Eldon had expressed surprise at this doctrine years before in Fx
parte Kendall, 17 Vesey, 514 (i311). In some jurisdictions, in
order to reach the estate of the deceased partner in equity, it was
declared necessary to aver and prove that there were no partnership
assets and that the other partners were insolvent. This, again, was
obviously an anomaly. The legislatures then began, in haphazard
fashion, to remedy the evil by making (in general) all contracts
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several as well as joint, unless expressly declared to be joint: See
Parsons (J.) on Part. § 82, ef seq. The contract of a creditor
with a partnership is, of all others, the one to which such legislation should be held applicable. Yet the Supreme Court of Colorado, in the case before us, actually decides that such contracts are
the only ones to which such statutes do not apply, and proceeds to
insist that the plaintiff must aver a failure of partnership assets in
order to reach the estate of the deceased partner. There can be no
doubt that the court is right in holding that there cannot be (as
seems to have been urged by counsel) one rule applicable to contracts evidenced by formal writings, and another applicable to oral
agreements and open accounts. It is submitted, however, that in
both cases the legal right of the creditor against the separate estate
of each partner, dead or alive, ought to be recognized to the full.
Except where authority requires the application of the mischievous
"bankruptcy rule," the firm creditor may seize and sell.the.separate estate. (See Afeech v. Allen, 17 N. Y. 300 (1858). See, also,
note on p. 367, Ames's Cases on Part ). If he may do so when
all the partners are alive, he ought, on principle, to have the same
rights when one is dead; and this is especially true where a statute
has dissipated thaf medmval conception, the "joint contract."
These considerations seem to answer the suggestion of the Colorado,
court, that "if a firm debt cannot be paid out of the separate property of a deceased partner except upon a certain contingency, the
partnership contract does not impose an absolutely several liability." The answer is that the partnership debt can be paid out
of the separate property of a partner under all circumstances,
except in the single contingency represented by the bankruptcy
rule.
PRACTICE; INVALIDITY OF APPOINTMENT OF MASTER IN DIVORCE

Legislation in Pennsylvania, while comprehensive upon the leading subject of stating the
causes of divorce, has provided meagerly for proceedings in the
courts. The second section of "An Act Concerning Divorces"
(March 13, i8x5, P. L. i5o), provides for a petition or libel, with
an affidavit of specified averments, the issue of a subpoena and the
service of the same, and, if the respondent be not found, for an
alias subpoena and publication, and for appearance and hearing,
and for an issue to be tried by a jury. This section ends with the
TO FIND FACTS AND SUGGEST DECREES.

provision

"

.

. .

but when neither of the parties requires an

issue to be so formed, the court may inquire and decide upon the
case in the presence of the parties ; or, if either of them will not
attend, then ex Parle by examination of witnesses on interrogatories, exhibits or other legal proof had either before or at the
hearing."
With such mere outlines of procedure, the details of practice
were conducted for many years under rules of the Courts of Common Pleas, and in accordance with decisions upon questions that
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arose in the course of litigation. The text and notes in II. Tr. &
H. Pr., § 2334, et seq. (Brightly Ed. i88o), indicate the respective sources of authority for carrying on such suits, and the
successive steps to be taken therein. In the county of Philadelphia the four Courts of Common Pleas adopted, to go into effect
the first Monday of January, 1884, a carefully drawn set of rulesin some regards an entirely new system-regulating the practice in
divorce. Prior to that time, cases in which there was no demand
for a jury trial were referred to an examiner (under certain stipulations as to interrogatories, notice, &c.), and witnesses were examined before him and their testimony reported to the court. One
important innovation made by the new rules was the substitution
of a master instead of an examiner. The language of the rule on
this point is, that "when a case is ready to be proceeded with,
either upon answer not demanding a trial by july, or exparte, a
master may be appointed by the court upon the written motion of
either party." Minute directions for all the proceedings before
the master are given in further sections of this rule of court, the
main features of which were. apparently intended to give actual
notice to the respondent, who had been served only by publication,
and to compel a careful examination in detail of each witness
upon "Iall matters relevant to a just and proper determination of
the cause."
It is further made a duty of the master to "report his proceedings and the testimony, together with his opinion of the case
. . and to file the same in the office of the prothonotary."
The manifest purpose of this change in practice was to secure care
and thoroughness in matters of such vital social importance as
divorces. Until very recently no question has been raised as to
the power of the courts to appoint such an officer. Now, however,
this has been considered and decided. A case contested before a
master, to whose report exceptions were filed and after argument
dismissed by the Court of Common Pleas, and the divorce granted,
was appealed by the respondent to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. There was no assignment of error to attack the validity of
the appointment of the master. The contention of the appellant
was upon very interesting questions as to the issue of desertion stated
in the exceptions which had been considered by the Court of Common Pleas, and the full and able argument of counsel made no reference to the right to appoint a master or to the scope of his power
when appointed.
The Supreme Court, however, of its own motion, decided that,
while the court below might appoint an examiner to take testimony
and report it, there is no authority under the act to appoint a master
to find facts and suggest a decree.
As this decision ends a practice which had existed for about fourteen years, it would be interesting to, in extenso, quote the exact
language of the judge who delivered the opinion of the Supreme
Court. But the whole extract on this point would be too long for
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this note. The conclusion of the court is in substance as just stated.
Judicial responsibility cannot be evaded by shifting it over to a
member of the bar. The following sentence may be given from the
opinion of Dean, J. : "Therefore, of whatever drudgery the court
of original jurisdiction may relieve itself in this class of cases by the
appointment of an examiner, neither it nor we can escape the burden
of a careful consideration of the evidence to ascertain if it does in
very truth establish the statutory grounds for a divorce."
While much might be said in favor of the careful and particular.
requirements of the rule of court, and the advantage of having an
opinion from a master who sees the witnesses, hears their oral testimony, reduces it to writing, and forms a judgment from personal
observation, yet the determination of the Supreme Court positively
uproots the present practice. The rule of court so far as concerns
the appointment of a master, and its provision for an opinion suggestive of a decree by him, is absolutely of no effect.
It may be conjectured that hereafter cases will be referred to
examiners in accordance with the old practice, since the opinion of
the Supreme Court expressly concedes that the Court of Common
Pleas may appoint an examiner to take testimony and report it:
Middleton v. Middle/on, 41 Atl. 291.
INNKEEPERS ; LIENS; GOODS OF THIRD PERSONS. The Code of
South Dakota provides that innkeepers shall have a lien on baggage
and other effects belonging to any person who shall abscond without
paying his hotel bills. The Supreme Court of that State has held, in
the case of McClain v. WiYiams, 76 N. W. 930 (Oct. x8, 1898),
that this provision of the code must be construed strictly and that
the innkeeper's lien will not attach to goods of third persons brought
into the hotel by the guest. The court takes the view that the code
supersedes the common law, and to allow the property of the third
person to be held for the debt of another would be unconstitutional
as depriving one of his property without due process of law. The
court holds that to allow such a lien would not be promotive of
justice. It is a question, however, whether or not issue might not
be joined upon this point. It is a rule in law that where one of two
innocent persons must suffer, by reason of the fraudulent acts of a
third person, he who has enabled the third person to commit the
fraud should be the one to suffer. At common lair, the goods of a
third person brought into a hotel as the goods of a guest and believed by the innkeeper to belong to the guest would be subject to

the lien: Sneef v. Watkins, i C. B. n. s. 266 (1856) ; Singer v.
Ailler, 52 Minn. 516 (1893) ; Zane v. Prentice, 13 Ore. 482
(1886) ; Covinton v. Newberger, 99 N. Car. 523 (x888).
And

it is hard to see why this is unjust. The third person by allowing
his goods to remain in the hands of the guest enables him to secure
credit for board and lodging, and as between him and the innkeeper
the latter would seem to have the greater equity. It might also be
questioned whether the view of the court in holding that the words

